Background[edit]
India, and Bengal in particular, had food shortages by the beginning of 1943 for the following reasons.
The food situation in India was tight from the beginning of the Second World War with a series of crop failures and localized famines which were dealt with successfully under the Indian Famine Codes.[4] In Bengal in 1940-41 there was a small scale famine although quick action by the authorities prevented widespread loss of life.[5] India as a whole faced a food shortage in 1943. After the Japanese occupation of Burma in March 1942, Bengal and the other parts of India and Ceylon which were normally supplied by Burma had to find food elsewhere. However, there were poor crops and famine situations in Cochin, Trivandrum and Bombay on the West coast and Madras, Orissa and Bengal in the East. It fell on the few surplus Provinces, mainly the Punjab, to supply the rest of India and Ceylon.[6]India as a whole had a deficit, but exported small quantities to meet the urgent needs of the Indian Army abroad, and those of Ceylon. India had imported 2 million tons of grain a year in previous years but there were only small net imports in 1943..
Bengal’s winter 1942 ‘aman’ rice crop, the most important one, was well below average.
In addition, Bengal was hit by a cyclone and three tidal waves on October 16, 1942. An area of 450 square miles were swept by tidal waves, 400 square miles affected by floods and 3200 square miles damaged by wind and torrential rain, destroying food crops. This killed 14,000[7] people. Reserve stocks in the hands of cultivators, consumers and dealers were destroyed.‘The homes, livelihood and property of nearly 2.5 million Bengalis were ruined or damaged.’[8] The districts affected were normally an important supplier of food to Greater Calcutta.[9]
The crop was then hit by a fungus infection, Helminthosporium oryzae, triggered by exceptional weather conditions: this hit the main December 1942 crop and caused serious falls in yield, as much as 50% to 90% in some varieties.[10] This was believed to have had more serious effects on supply than the cyclone.[11] The only evidence by an expert in the subject concludes, 'The only other instance [of disease damage]that bears comparison in loss sustained by a food crop and the human calamity that followed in its wake is the Irish potato famine of 1845.'.[12]
Bengal had been a food importer for the previous decade. Calcutta was normally supplied by Burma. The Allies had suffered a disastrous defeat at Singapore in 1942 against the Japanese military, which then occupied Burma. Burma was the world's largest exporter of rice in the inter-war period.[13] By 1940 15% of India's rice came from Burma.[14] From January 1942 until the end of the war, no Burmese rice reached India.
Carry-over stocks of grain, the stocks over and above the new crop, usually a protection against food shortages, were well below the normal two months' supply,[15] because the 1941 crop was below average, because of the lack of imports from Burma, because of exports from Bengal to provinces with shortages, and because of compulsory purchases by government for military and civil service use in 1942.[16] Normally the carry-over would give extra supplies, cushioning the effect of a bad crop.
Bengal’s food needs rose at the same time from the influx of refugees from Burma: the number is not known but guesses from 100,000 to 500,000 were made. In addition, a substantial body of troops were stationed in Bengal to defend it against the expected invasion.
Some politicians, officials, and traders stated from late 1942 that these factors alone made a serious famine in 1943 inevitable. Other politicians and officials stated that in spite of these factors, Bengal had plenty of food available to feed its population, and even to export, and they acted as though this was certainly the case. It is not known what they really believed. The Famine Inquiry Commission showed in detail that the people who stated that Bengal had plenty of food dominated the political and administrative decision-making up to mid 1943 at least, losing influence as the evidence accumulated that their assumptions were contradicted by observations on the ground, as their policies proved ineffectual, and as it became clear that a major famine was in progress. It was not until the new Viceroy, Archibald Wavell, who was a successful general, took office in August 1943, that substantial quantities of grain started to move to Bengal: half a million tons of grain were eventually shipped there, but there was never enough food available to provide the minimum relief specified in the Famine Code.[17][18]
The Famine Inquiry Commission was damning about the policies, actions and failures to act of the Government of India, of the Bengal Government, of other provincial governments and of the rice trade. It also called attention to the general corruption. Few governments have ever published such critical reports on their actions: the Government of India printed very few copies of the extremely embarrassing report and suppressed the evidence that the report was based on. By 1945 it was generally agreed that governments, politicians, officials, firms and individuals were all, to some extent, responsible for the failure to deal with the famine, and were to some extent responsible for the fact that there was a famine at all.
Bengal famine of 1943
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